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21. Introduction
Recently much concern has been expressed about the impact of the
dollar depreciation on the real export earnings of OPEC and the
implications of any protective action taken by OPEC on world economic
conditions and the future stability of the dollar. With approximately 80
percent of OPEC imports originating outside the United States and with a
predominantly large proportion of OPEC's past accumulated surpluses
invested in dollar denominated assets, the loss incurred as the result of
dollar depriciation appears to be substantial. Moreover this loss will
be heavier in the future if the historical trend of OPEC's trade shares
with the strong currency countries such as Japan and Germany, continues
its upward momentum.
To protect its export earnings, OPEC can, in principle, either change
the dollar price of oil or shift from its existing dollar-oil pricing
system to a system based on a currency basket. Adopting the first
option, the main problem is the determination of the exact amount that
the price of oil should be raised to compensate for any fall in the real
price of oil arising from movements in the value of industrial
currencies. The second option, namely adopting a currency basket, also
poses some serious problems. In this case, the problems are of two
kinds: one, the determination of a weighting scheme to be used in the
calculation of the currency basket which would be acceptable to all OPEC
member countries, and second and more crucial, the feasibility and
practicality of any basket-currency unit-pricing mechanism within the
existing international monetary system. Considering the wide differences
existing among OPEC member countries in terms of their trading structures
3and their balance of payment positions, the adoption of any common basket
currency is apt to impart different costs and benefits to different
member countries and hence result in conflicts of economic interests.
Clearly each country would, ideally, like to see the chosen weighting
scheme be more closely aligned with its own trade and investment
patterns. Thus, a solution must be found to resolve these conflicts of
interest if OPEC's adherence to a unified oil pricing policy is to be
continued in the future.
The objective of this paper is to analyze the impact of the dollar
fluctuation on the purchasing power of OPEC's oil revenues and to
identify some of the major problems facing OPEC in its attempt to
substitute any other currency or a "basket of currency" for the dollar.
The study is set out in four sections. Section two will explore some
of the general issues concerning the role of the dollar in the existing
oil pricing system and how its fluctuation may affect different OPEC
member countries differently. Section three begins with a careful study
of OPEC's terms of trade and its sources of change. We decompose the
sources of growth of OPEC's terms of trade into three parts. These are:
(a) the growth in the dollar price of oil; (b) a part due to inflation in
OPEC's trading partners; and (c) a part due to the fluctuation of the
dollar vis-a-vis other industrial currencies. Within the analytical
framework developed in this section, a formula is derived which
determines the value of a currency basket called OPECA, in terms of the
U.S. dollar, which has the property of cushioning the real price of oil
from the risk of exchange rate changes if it is used as a denominator for
the price of oil. This currency basket which is composed of the
4currencies of the major OPEC trading partners provides OPEC with a solid
basis for determining the necessary changes in the dollar-price of oil in
order to keep its real export earnings immune from the risk of exchange
rate changes. To achieve this objective all that is required is to
adjust the dollar price of oil by the amount that the optimum currency
basket fluctuates with respect to the dollar. Section four finally
concludes the paper with a brief summary and some important conclusions.
2. The Problem
I
Since, at present, the United States dollar serves both as a
denominator for pricing crude oil and as a medium of payment between the
oil-importing nations and the members of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC), then, any movement in the value of the dollar
against other currencies affects the real export earnings of OPEC. Any
downward movement in the value of the dollar in the foreign exchange
markets results in an erosion of OPEC purchasing power by making the OPEC
imports originating outside the United States more expensive.
Conversely, any upward movement in the value of the dollar increases the
implicit price of oil and thereby results in a windfall gain in OPEC's
fortune.
With approximately 80 percent of OPEC imports originating outside the
United States and with a predominantly large proportion of OPEC's past
accumulated surplus invested in dollar-denominated assets, the loss or
gain incurred as the result of dollar fluctuation appears to be
substantial. For instance, a uniform 10 percent depreciation of the
5dollar against the currencies of other industrial countries will result
in a loss of about 8 percent in OPEC's real purchasing power and in a
loss of about $7.6 billion in asset value as calculated on OPEC's total
foreign investment at the end of 1977.1
With the continued depreciation of the dollar in the foreign exchange
markets since the beginning of 1977 and with a shadow of uncertainty
surrounding its future value, the question in the mind of most economists
and international financial experts is, how long the oil exporting
countries are prepared to tolerate the shrinkage of their export earnings
by accepting payments in a declining dollar. The options open to OPEC
are rather limited. To protect the real value of its exports OPEC can,
in principle, either increase the dollar price of oil or change its
pricing mechanism to a currency basket.
Increasing the dollar price of oil will not by itself necessarily
increase OPEC's revenues. It may very well be the case that the positive
effect of an oil price increase may be offset partly or entirely by a
cutback in oil consumption. In this case, the cutback in oil consumption
will most likely come from the United States where the oil price increase
exerts its fullest impact. With oil priced in terms of the U.S. dollar,
any increase in the price of oil will hit the U.S. economy by exactly the
same amount. Whereas the impact of an oil price increase on the other
industrial countries is moderated to the extent that their currencies
increase with respect to the dollar, and assuming that the recent upward
movements in the value of the industrial currencies continue in the
future, the real shock of any oil price increase on these economies may
be moderated and therefore the induced oil consumption cutback coming
from these countries may not be significant. In fact, looking at the
recent past, one realizes that the devaluation of the dollar against
other industrial currencies, especially the strong currencies, has been
an important factor in cheapening the cost of imported oil to the Western
European countries and Japan,2 and thereby has allowed a higher rate of
economic growth for these countries than might otherwise have been the
case.
Apart from the important role that the behavior of the dollar in the
foreign exchange markets can play in shaping the world's demand for oil
and thereby determining the limits of OPEC maneuvering in the area of oil
price policy, there are the behaviors of other non-OPEC oil-producing
countries which have a direct influence on the final outcome of any
unilateral oil price increase on OPEC's oil revenues. However, allowing
for the influences of the actions taken by these countries in response to
any oil price hike administered by OPEC, can only make the picture more
complicated. Part of this complication stems from the lack of
understanding and information regarding the oil production and export
policies of these countries. For example, it is not clearly known
whether these countries will follow OPEC in the case of an oil price
increase administered by OPEC or whether they will stay with the lower
price and use this as a means of increasing their share of the market.
The second option open to OPEC is to adopt a currency basket for
oil-pricing purposes. It is important to realize that although this
approach has the advantage of stabilizing the real earnings of oil to
OPEC, it poses two serious problems: one, technical, namely the
determination of a weighting scheme for the calculation of the currency
7basket; and, second, the feasibility and the practicality of a currency
basket within the existing international monetary system. The problem of
the determination of a currency basket which would be considered optimum
from the viewpoint of OPEC's economic interests and the problem of its
feasibility as a unit of account for price of oil will be discussed in
great detail in Section three of our study. However, for the moment it
is important to come to the realization that such a procedure works like
a double-edged knife. It benefits OPEC if the dollar continues its
recent plunging, but it will deny OPEC of a windfall gain if the dollar
recovers from its present low level and moves up in the future.
II
But the uncertainties surrounding the future value of the dollar are
both worrisome and real. Under the existing floating exchange rate,
system governments are not committed to maintain the par value of their
national currencies by intervening in the foreign exchange markets
anymore. The fate of exchange rates has been largely left to market
forces, and fluctuations in exchange rates are considered to be part of
the rule rather than the exception. With the capital markets of most of
the industrial countries connected together through the massive and
expanding Euro-currency markets, and with divergent underlying economic
fundamentals, such as inflation rates, growth rates, productivity
differences and degrees of openness between the United States and other
industrial countries, it is hard to expect any degree of stability for
the future value of the dollar unless these underlying differences are
smoothed out.
8It is indeed with reference to these underlying economic fundamentals
and their relative significance in determining exchange rates in the long
run that some people have come up with some gloomy pictures about the
future stability of the dollar. According to these people, so long as
the United States runs its present enormous current-account deficit, and
lags behind in the growth of productivity, and is the forerunner in the
growth of inflation, the dollar will continue losing value in the foreign
exchange markets.
On the other hand, under the floating exchange rate system, the
movements in exchange rates are supposed to act as equilibrating forces
in reducing the payment imbalances among the industrial countries.
However, from the recent experience of the major currencies it has been
learned that reliance on exchange rate policy for reducing trade
imbalances may be self-defeating if it is not accompanied by suitable
monetary and fiscal policies.
III
The loss in OPEC's purchasing power due to the dollar depreciation is
more likely to be heavier in the future if the historical trend of OPEC's
trade shares with the countries of Western Europe and Japan continues its
upward momentum. As is revealed by the information in Table 1.1 the
Japanese and German shares of OPEC's imports have, especially, increased
tremendously over the period 1970-1977. In 1970, Japan supplied about
9.94 percent o OPEC's total import needs, where in 1977 it supplied
about 15 percent resulting in an increase of about 5 percent. The gain
in German shares is less significant, from a value of 11.03 percent in
9Table 1.1
The Change in OPEC's Import Shares*
1970
(1)
U.S.
Japan
Belgium
France
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Switzerland
1977
(2) (2)-(1)
17.41
15.0
21.02
9.94
2.17
9.35
11.03
5.58
2.88
1.79
10.32
2.27
6.96
13.74
7.55
2.73
1.84
9.19
Note: These shares are based on OPEC's total imports coming from
the industrial countries considered here, not on its total
world trade. These data were taken from the IMF Direction
of Trade, various issues.
-3.61
5.06
.10
-2.35
2.71
U.K.
1.97
-.15
.05
-1.13
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1970 to a value of 13.74 percent in 1977. The main loser, as is evident
from Table 1.1 has been the United States. The U.S. share of OPEC's
imports declined from a value of 21.02 percent in 1970 to a value of
17.41 percent in 1977.
To express any intelligent thought on the likelihood of further
decline in U.S. share of OPEC's imports, due attention should be paid to
three sets of considerations: (a) the future behavior of the dollar in
the foreign exchange markets; (b) the inflation differential between the
U.S. and other industrial countries, and (c) OPEC's trade elasticities of
substitution. (a) and (b) combined, along with other factors, determine
the U.S. competitive position in the foreign markets in general and in
OPEC's market in particular. With a given level of inflation
differential any downward movement in the value of the dollar will
enhance the U.S. competitive position against other industrial countries
and consequently will make U.S. exports more attractive in foreign
markets. However, the effect of the dollar depreciation on the U.S.
competitive position may very ell be offset partially or entirely by a
higher rate of inflation prevailing in the U.S. than in other industrial
countries.
Comparing the recent history of U.S. inflation with two of its major
trade competitors, namely Japan and Germany, we get a rather mixed
picture. From 1974 to 1976 Japan, with an average annual rate of
inflation of 13.43 percent, comes to the top of the list; second is the
U.S. with an average annual rate of 8 percent, and third is Germany with
a rate of 5.03 percent. However, this picture changes dramatically from
the beginning of 1977 with the U.S. surpassing the other two countries in
terms of inflation, and this trend continues to the first quarter of 1978
where the rates were 2.3%, 4.3% and 5.7% for Japan, Germany, and the
U.S., respectively.
It appears in retrospect that it has been precisely partly due to the
higher rate of inflation prevailing in the U.S. since 1977, that the
tremendous devaluation of the dollar against the currencies of other
countries has not improved the U.S. competitive position appreciably.
Table 1.2 sets out the movements in the exchange rates of a number of key
industrial countries vis-a-vis the dollar, and the changes in their
competitive positions as measured by the changes in their real effective
exchange rates. From these observations it can be realized that, in
general, the changes in the real effective exchange rates of most of the
European countries and Japan are smaller than the amount their currencies
have appreciated against the dollar. For instance, during the period
June '77 to July '78, the Swiss franc and the Japanese yen appreciated by
40 percent and 37.7 percent respectively against the dollar, whereas the
changes in the real effective exchange rates of these two countries
amounted only to 23.1 and 24.3 percent. Although the relatively
substantial increase in the real effective exchange rate of the Swiss
franc and yen indicates a sizeable decline in the competitive position of
Switzerland and Japan, these values are much below the amount their
currencies have appreciated against the dollar. In the case of Germany,
the favorable inflation differential in this country has indeed more than
offset the effect of the appreciation of the mark against the dollar and
has resulted in a slight improvement in this country's competitive
position.
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Table 1.2
Exchange Rate Changes and the Change in
The Competitive Position of the Key Industrial Countries
June 1977 - July 1978
Currency Vis-a-Vis Competitive
U.S. Dollar Position
U.S. dollar 
- -6.4
Japanese yen 37.7 24.3
British pound 12. 6.3
Swiss franc 40. 23.1
German mark 15.2 
-3.3
French franc 12.3 5.7
Italian lira 5.1 
-1.1
Belgian franc 12.2 
-2.0
Dutch guilder 12.4 0.0
Source: World Financial Markets, Morgan Guranty Trust Co. of New York,
July 1978.
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Even if we assume that the dollar devaluation in the future will
actually improve the U.S. price-competitive position, the question still
remains, whether this by itself can induce OPEC countries to switch their
import expenditures away from Japan and Germany and towards the United
States. To answer this question, an examination of factors determining
the import shares of OPEC with the major industrial countries is
necessary. Broadly speaking, it can be argued that the degree to which
any change in the relative export prices can lead to a redirection of
import patterns towards the country with a lower price depends on OPEC's
trade elasticities of substitution and the significance of other
non-price related determinants of OPEC's trade structure. If OPEC's
trade elasticities of substitution are high, then any reduction in
relative prices brought about by a devaluation of the dollar is expected
to have a stimulative impact on the U.S. exports to OPEC, otherwise the
effectiveness of devaluation on expanding U.S. share of OPEC's imports is
rather low. Even though the U.S. has been losing its share of exports in
OPEC's markets during the time period 1970-1977, OPEC has increased its
importance as a market for U.S. exports. In 1970 the OPEC economies as a
whole absorbed about 4 percent of total U.S. exports, where in 1977 they
absorbed about 11 percent. This significant increase in the importance
of OPEC as a market for U.S. exports is clearly due to the fact that,
during this period, U.S. exports to OPEC have increased much faster than
U.S. exports to all other countries. The relatively higher rate of
growth of U.S. exports to OPEC is partly due to the phenomenonal economic
growth enjoyed by OPEC economies during the period 1973-1977 and partly
due to the establishment of a closer economic and political tie between
U.S. and some countries, namely Iran and Saudi Arabia.
14
IV
Because OPEC member countries differ in terms of their trading and
investment patterns, the impact of the dollar depreciation varies
considerably from country to country. It is clear that countries such as
Indonesia, Iraq, and Libya, which purchase a large proportion of their
import needs in markets outside the U.S., bear a higher burden of foreign
trade exchange losses than countries such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
and Venezuela which have a closer trade tie with the United States. If
we take into account the losses incurred on the dollar asset holdings the
picture gets more complicated.
In this regard, however, a distinction has to be made between the
countries who have a substantial proportion of their accumulated surplus
or their outstanding debt in dollar-denominated assets and those
countries who have achieved a more balanced currency diversification of
their assets or debts across all currencies. Clearly, the losses or
gains incurred as the result of dollar depreciation are more pronounced
to member countries who have a higher degree of concentration of their
assets or debts in terms of the dollar than the rest of the countries.
The lack of homogeneity in OPEC member countries with regard to their
trade and investment patterns imparts a number of serious difficulties in
any serious discussion concerning the switch from a dollar oil-pricing
system to any other currency system or basket of currencies. The major
difficulty in the case of opting for a basket-type accounting unit is the
determination of a weighting scheme which is acceptable to all member
countries. Clearly each country would, ideally, like to see the chosen
weighting scheme be more closely aligned with its own trade and
investment pattern.
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Recognizing this divergence of underlying economic situations and the
resulting divergence of interests, a solution must be found which would
lead to a commonly acceptable weighting scheme if OPEC's adherence to a
unified oil-pricing policy is to be continued. It is therefore necessary
that the problem of choosing an optimal weighting scheme be solved within
a general framework which encompasses the various considerations
regarding the trade and investment demands of different OPEC member
countries for different currencies. Within this calculation explicit
account should be taken of the vast differences existing among OPEC
member countries in terms of their balance of payment situations in
addition to their different trade structures.
Table 1.3 presents some data on the net external assets of OPEC
countries for the years 1976 and 1977. As can be seen from this table,
there are four countries, Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon, and Indonesia, whose
external liabilities greatly exceed their external assets. These
countries as a group had a net external liability of about $13 billion in
1976 and about $15 billion in 1977. Contrasting these countries are four
other countries--Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and UAE--whose net external
assets accounted for about 90 percent of OPEC's $155 billion net external
assets in 1977. Since a predominantly high proportion of these assets or
debts are demoninated in terms of U.S. dollars, then any devaluation of
the dollar will confer a substantial loss or gain to the surplus or
deficit countries. It will hurt the surplus countries by eroding the
purchasing power of their dollar holdings but at the same time it will
benefit the deficit countries by reducing the real value of their
dollar-denominated debts. Given this divergence of economic situation
16
Table 1.3
Net External Assets of OPEC Countries
(billions of U.S. dollars)
1976 1977
Kuwait 25 31
Qatar 4 5
UAE 12 16
Saudi Arabia 56 68
Algeria -3 -4
Ecuador -- -1
Gabon -1 -1
Indonesia -9 -9
Iran 18 22
Iraq 5 7
Libya 6 8
Nigeria 5 3
Venezuela 9 10
TOTAL 126 155
Source: World Financial Markets, Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. of New York,
Nov. 1977.
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prevailing in OPEC countries and given the substantial loss and gain at
stake, a solution must be found to resolve some of the resulting
conflicts of interest if OPEC's cohesiveness is to be maintained in the
future. One way of resolving some of these issues is to apply the
principle of compensation. This principle dictates that if a change from
state A to state B, which is considered to be preferable from the view
point of the group as a whole, benefits some member countries at the cost
of others. The countries which benefit from the change should compensate
the losers in a mutually agreeable manner. In applying this principle to
the case of OPEC, it is first of all necessary to solve the problem of
the choice of an optimum currency basket based on the assumption that
OPEC is a homogeneous entity, and then to try to identify the losers and
the gainers if the currency basket option is adopted. This is the
procedure which we will pursue in the next section. After determining
the optimum currency basket for OPEC as a whole, an assessment of the
costs and benefits conferred to the individual member countries arising
from the implementation of the proposed solution will be made.
3. The Erosion of OPEC Purchasing Power by Worldwide
Inflation and Exchange Rate Changes
3.1 Introduction
The primary objective pursued in this section is to analyze the
fluctuation in OPEC's terms of trade and its sources of growth over the
period 1970 (IV) to 1971 (IV). With the price of oil quoted in terms of
U.S. dollars and constant price of oil, the terms of trade can change
either as the result of movements in the value of the dollar or as the
result of inflation in OPEC's trading partners. Thus, a question of
18
great concern is to separate the influences of these two factors and to
see to what extent the continuous decline in OPEC's terms of trade after
the four-fold oil price increase of October 1973, can be attributed to
the falling value of the dollar and to what extent to the high rates of
inflation prevailing in the industrial countries.
3.2 The Model
Assuming oil is the only export of the OPEC countries, the terms of
trade , ti, of the ith member contry can be written as
ti = Po/Pmi (3.1)
where Po is the price of oil3 and Pmi is the unit import price for ith
country, both expressed in terms of the same currency (dollar in this
case).
From (3.1) the rate of growth of ti can be written as the difference
between the rates of growth of Po and Pmi, that is,
ti/ti = Po/Po - Pmi/Pmi (3.1a)
where . on the top of any variable indicates the time derivative of that
variable.
To derive the unit import price index for ith country we first write
the total value of its imports in U.S. dollar as,
Vi =Xij Pj Rj (3.2)
where Xij is the quantity of imports of ith OPEC country coming from jth
country, Pj is the export price of jth country expressed in terms of its
domestic currency and Rj is the exchange rate of jth country defined as
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the price of domestic currency in terms of U.S. dollar.
Differentiating both sides of (3.2) with respect to time and then
converting them into growth rates yields:
Vi/Vi =Ebij Xij/Xij +bij Pj/Pj +bij Rj/Rj (3.3)
J j J
whereby bij is the proportion of ith country's imports originating from
the jth industrial country.
Equation (3.3) expresses the rate of growth of imports of any country
in terms of three items: (a) the rate of growth of the quantity of that
country's imports; (b) the rate growth of inflation in the industrial
countries, and (c) a measure of dollar's fluctuation against other
currencies.
By integrating both sides of (3.3) we can write the total value of
imports as the product of three terms, namely,
Vi = Ai . Xi . Pi . Ri (3.3a)
where Pi = bi j Pj/Pj dt,
Xi biJ Xij/Xijdt and
Ri =Ebij Rj/Rj dt
are the price, quantity, and exchange rate indices for ith country4,
and Ai is a constant term.
From (3.3a) it follows that the unit import price index in terms of
U.S. dollar for the ith OPEC member country is given by Pi Ri with its
growth rate by,
Pmi/Pmi = bij Pj/Pj +Itbij Rj/Rj (3.4)
J i
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By substituting (3.4) into (3.1a) we arrive at the final equation which
expresses the rate of change in the ith country's terms of trade in terms
of its determining factors, that is,
ti/ti = o/Po - bij Pj/Pj - bij Rj/Rj (3.5)
J J
Equation (3.5) can be interpreted as a decomposition of the ith OPEC
member country's terms of trade into three sources: (a) the rate of
growth of the dollar price of oil; (b) a weighted average of the
inflation rates in the industrial countries 5 and (c) a measure of the
dollar's fluctuation against other currencies.
3.3 The Empirical Results
In implementing equation (3.5) empirically we have considered the
trade shares of OPEC with nine of the key industrial countries. These
are: the United States, Japan, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Together these
countries account for an overwhelmingly large proportion of OPEC's world
trade. For instance, in 1977 they supplied about 76.7% of total OPEC's
import needs.
The data on imports of OPEC as a whole and for individual member
countries were taken directly from the IMF Direction of Trade. These
data refer to total imports of goods and services in millions of U.S.
dollars. The data on exchange rates and on export prices were taken from
the IMF International Financial Statistics. These include 29 quarterly
observations from the fourth quarter of 1970 to the fourth quarter of
1977.
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Table 3.1 reports the numerical results of our analysis of the
sources of change of OPEC's terms of trade for the time period
1971-1977. Perhaps the strongest impression conveyed by this table is
the varying effect that the movement in the value of the dollar has had
on OPEC's terms of trade. Over the period 1971-1973 where the dollar
depreciated against most of the other industrial currencies, its downward
movement eroded OPEC's terms of trade by 5.5 percent a year.
However, for the next three years, from 1974 through 1976, when the
dollar recovered strongly from its previous low level, and climbed
noticeably vis-a-vis the British pound and Italian lira, its appreciation
benefited OPEC by increasing the implicit price of oil by about 2.3
percent a year. For the final year 1977, when the dollar set its
downward trend once again, it cost the oil exporting countries 6.7
percent in decline in their real export earnings. Averaged over the time
period 1971-1977, the fluctuation in the value of the dollar has shrunk
OPEC's purchasing power by about 2.3 percent a year. In terms of
relative contribution this amounts to about 8.7 percent a year. From the
information in Table 3.1 it can also be observed that inflation has been
a more damanging factor in eroding OPEC's export earnings than has been
the devaluation of the dollar. For instance, averaged over the whole
period 1971-1977, the contribution of inflation amounted to about 9.03
percent as compared to about 2.3 percent due to the dollar's fluctuation.
The accompanying chart exhibits the time pattern of OPEC's terms of
trade over the period 1971 (IV) to 1977 (IV). From this chart it can be
seen that the change in OPEC's terms of trade, except for the sharp jump
in the first quarter of 1974 which amounted to about 120 percent, has
22
Table 3.1
The Sources of Percentage Change in OPEC's* Terms of Trade
Term of trade
16.52
2.908
72.54
106.52
10.22
-7.90
-6.165
27.80
Price of oil
25.14
8.66
96.9
130.46
10.27
-.73
2.98
39.097
Inflation
-3.99
-3.77
-14.83
-26.58
-1.69
-9.93
-2.43
-9.032
Dollar 's
Fluctuation
-4.49
-2.51
-9.52
+2.63
+1.64
+2.76
-6.717
-2.31
Relative
contribution (100) (140.63) (-32.48) (-8.30)
*OPEC member countries included in this calculation are Algeria,
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela.
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
Annual
average
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been rather moderate over the whole period. In fact, it has become
continuously negative since the beginning of 1976, after a relatively
high rise of about 10.7 percent in the last quarter of 1975.
Referring to the impact of the dollar's fluctuation on the import
cost of individual OPEC countries, Table 3.2 presents the contributions
of the fluctuation in the value of the dollar and inflation to the rate
of change of unit price of imports for a selected number of OPEC
countries. Looking at this table we immediately realize that the impact
of the dollar depreciation on the cost of imports has not been uniform
across all countries. It has increased the cost of imports to some
countries much more than to others. For instance, the depreciation of
the dollar during the time period 1971-1977 has contributed about 12
percent to the increase in the cost of imports of Indonesia, but it has
contributed only 5 percent to the increase in the cost of Libyan
imports. For the rest of OPEC countries included in our sample and
during the same period of time, the depreciation of the dollar has
increased their import costs by about 20 percent a year.
The wide disparity observed in the experience of different OPEC
member countries in bearing the cost of dollar's depreciation is both
interesting and important. It is important because it brings to the
surface some of the potential conflicts existing in OPEC countries
associated with the existing dollar-oil-pricing system and, at the same
time, it points to the serious problems facing OPEC in trying to change
its pricing mechanism from a dollar-based system to any other currency
system.
24
Table 3.2
The Impact of the Dollar's Fluctuation and Inflation on the Rate
of Change of Unit Import Price of a Selected Number of OPEC
Countries
Averaged over 1971-1977
(Annual percentage rate of change)
Country Dollar
Fluctuation
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Kuwait
Libya
Saudi Arabia
Venezuela
3.74
(32.95)
2.99
(25.98)
2.85
(25.16)
2.52
(22.08)
.66
(5.77)
2.37
(21.42)
1.86
(17.35)
Inflation
7.61
(67.05)
8.52
(74.02)
8.48
(74.84)
8.8q
(77.92)
10.79
(94.23)
8.69
(78.57)
8.85
(82.27)
Import Price
11.35
(100)
11.51
(100)
11.33
(100)
11.41
(100)
11.45
(100)
11.06
(100)
10.71
(100)
Note: Numbers in parentheses are relative contribution of each
item to the rate of change of unit import price.
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These potential conflicts stem partly from the wide differences in
trade patterns existing among OPEC countries and partly from the erratic
behavior of industrial currencies. It is undoubtedly true that as far as
there are differences in the trade directions of OPEC countries and as
far as there is no uniformity in the movements of industrial currencies,
different countries will be subjected to different cost of exchange rate
changes. It is also true that the cost will be higher to countries whose
import shares are mostly weighted toward the strong-currency countries
than countries whose imports are mostly originating from the
weak-currency countries. This, in fact, seems to be the main reason
behind the big difference observed between Indonesia and Libya in terms
of the increase in their cost of imports attributed to the depreciation
of the dollar. Indonesia's main supplier of imports, during 1971-1977,
was Japan6 whose currency has appreciated tremendously against the
dollar, whereas Libya's7 main trading partner was Italy whose currency
has lost value appreciably against the dollar.
3.4. The "Optimum" Currency Basket
One way of insulating the real export earnings of OPEC from the risk
of exchange rate changes is to denominate the price of oil in terms of a
currency which is composed of the currencies of OPEC's principal trading
partners. This approach, though in principle having the advantage of
cushioning the real price of oil from currency changes, poses two serious
problems: one, technical, namely the determination of the exact weights
to be assigned to different currencies; and two, and more crucial, the
feasibility and practicality of any currency basket accounting unit
27
within the existing international monetary setting.
To discuss the issue of the feasibility of any "basket-type"
currency-pricing mechanism, it is important to draw a distinction between
two rather separable functions that the accounting currency is supposed
to serve. It is to serve as the denominator for the price of oil and as
the medium of payment, and normally these two functions are separable.
This separability property of the accounting currency makes it possible
to employ one currency for one purpose and another currency for another
purpose. For instance, it is possible to keep the U.S. dollar as the
medium of payment but at the same time quote the dollar price of oil in
terms of an "optimally determined" currency basket. This procedure, if
followed, has the advantage of solving the more difficult and rather
impractical problem of paying for oil with different currencies, a
problem which would have existed under a complete currency basket pricing
mechanism.
Let us call the currency basket which is considered to be optimum
from OPEC's point of view, OPECA, then to stabilize the real price of oil
in terms of OPECA it is necessary to adjust the dollar price of oil by
the fluctuation of OPECA in terms of the dollar. This follows quite
easily from the following identify:
(OPECA) = ( $ ) . (OPECA) (3.6)
OIL OIL $
X = Y 1/R
where X and Y are the prices of oil in terms of OPECA and dollars
respectively, and R is the exchange rate between OPECA and dollars
defined as the price of OPECA in terms of dollars.
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From (3.6) it follows that to stabilize the price of oil in terms of
OPECA it is necessary that,
Y/Y = R/R (3.7)
The problem is, then, reduced to the determination of OPECA in terms
of dollars. However, from our investigation of the impact of the
dollar's fluctuation on OPEC's purchasing power in the previous section,
it follows that by defining R according to the following equation
R/R =bj Rj/Rj (3.8)
we are insured that it will serve to insulate the real price of oil from
the risk of exchange rate changes. Adopting this definition of R, Table
3.2 contains its numerical value and its annual growth rate for the
period 1970 to 1977. The accompanying chart also exhibits its time trend
over the same period of time. From Table 3.3 it can be observed that
over the whole period 1971-1977 OPECA has appreciated in terms of the
dollar by 16.2 percent. This implies an average annual appreciation of
about 2.31 percent.
Table 3.4 compares our estimates of oil revenues for the four
quarters of 1977 if oil prices were quoted in terms of OPECA with the
actual oil revenues in terms of the dollar. The difference for just one
year is about $2.15 billion. That means if OPECA were actually used as
the denominator for the price of oil, OPEC's revenue would have increased
by $2.15 billion in just 1977.
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Table 3.3
The Numerical Value of OPECA (currency-basket)
and its Annual Growth Rate
(1971-1977)
Value at End of Year* Rate of Change
100
103.02
101.97
111.71
108.54
106.56
103.62
110.73
4.49
2.51
9.52
-2.63
-1.54
-2.76
6.71
Note: *Normalized at 100 in the fourth quarter of 1970.
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
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Table 3.4
Estimate Oil Revenue if Oil Price were Denominated
in Terms of $ and OPECA
(billions of $)
Oil Price
(1)
in *$
31.9
32.6
32.3
32.3
129.1
Oil Price in
(2)
OPECA
(2) - (1)
32.15 .25
32.94 .34
32.82
33.34
.54
1.04
2.15131.25
*Source: Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, March 1978.
Year
1977
I
II
III
IV
TOTAL
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4. Conclusion
In this paper we analyzed the role of the U.S. dollar in the existing
oil-pricing mechanisms and tried to determine how its fluctuation has
affected OPEC member countries over the period 1971-1977. It was found
that the depreciation of the dollar has eroded the real import earnings
of OPEC as a whole by about 16.24 percent over the period 1971-1977. The
real export earnings of OPEC were further eroded bh inflation prevailing
in OPEC's trading partners by about 63.2 percent over the same period of
time.
In terms of the impact of the dollar's fluctuation on individual OPEC
member countries, it was found that Indonesia was the hardest hit and
Libya was the least hit by the depreciation of the dollar over the period
1971-1977. The experience of other member countries was more or less
uniform. This difference in the experience of OPEC member countries was
then attributed to the difference in their trade structure and to the
nonuniform behavior of the major currencies against each other.
The problem of how OPEC can protect is export earnings from the risk
of currency fluctuation was discussed in detail. Specifically it was
shown that OPEC can, at least in principle, insulate its export earnings
from the risk of currency fluctuation by denominating the price of oil in
terms of a "currency basket" which is composed of the currencies of
OPEC's major trading partners. We derived a formula which would
explicitly calculate the value of this currency basket, which we called
OPECA, in terms of the U.S. dollar. It was then shown that this currency
basket can provide a useful basis for determining the necessary changes
in the dollar price of oil in order to keep the real price of oil immune
from the risk of exchange rate changes.
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